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A-iooking into the future is a perilous
duty, and it is wise to be humble about our
abilities lest we give the impression we
know more than we do. The difficulties in
accurately assessing the economy's future,
if not its current state, stem from our inabil-
ity to grasp the broad scope of business
activity and to anticipate the seemingly
random patterns that aggregate measures
of the economy frequently follow.
At the midyear meeting of the Fourth
District Economists' Roundtable, held
May 20 at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Cleveland, we considered our limita-
tions in describing the U.S. business cy-
cle and looked at the capacity of fore-
casters to predict future economic
events. We also asked participants to
summarize the current and prospective
state of the economy.
• "If you give them a number, don't
give them a date. If you give them a
date, don't give them a number."
— Anonymous forecaster
The panelists were generally not sur-
prised by the slower economic growth
indicated in the first-quarter GDP re-
port, following the sharp upturn in ac-
tivity during the final three months of
1993. The first-quarter performance is
viewed as a return to the growth pat-
tern established last fall — a pattern
that is expected to continue over the
seven-quarter forecast period. The
three-year-old boom in capital spend-
ing should continue fueling growth, as
should consumer spending on durable
goods and housing. Spending spurred
by low interest rates, however, will likely
be replaced by the income effects of in-
creased employment. Meanwhile, the
foreign sector is projected to improve
only marginally as the economies of
our major trading partners begin their
slow recoveries.
Major constraints on growth are fore-
seen coming from the public sector. In
addition to addressing continuing de-
clines in government spending, the
Roundtable also raised concerns about
further federal tax increases.
Given these factors, the group's me-
dian forecast sees real GDP expanding
roughly 3
 x/j percent in the second quar-
ter, moderating to approximately 3 per-
cent in 1994:IIIQ, and then settling to a
growth trajectory of around 2V4 percent
over the remainder of the forecast hori-
zon (figure 1).
Roundtable participants expressed con-
siderable confidence in the outlook, and
risks to the forecast are comparatively
low (figure 2). For this year, the group
assigns a 48 percent probability to real
GDP rising between 3.0 and 3.9 percent
and a 33 percent chance to growth in
the 2.0 to 2.9 percent range. For 1995,
that pattern reverses, with nearly a 40
percent probability of growth in the 2.0
to 2.9 percent range and a 32 percent
likelihood of reaching the faster 3.0 to
3.9 percent pace. In neither year is the
probability of a recession thought to be
very high — less than 2 percent.
The Fourth District Economists'
Roundtable brings together the
unique perspectives of analysts from
many sectors of the economy, particu-
larly finance and manufacturing. The
thrice-annual meetings also provide a
forum for business economists, aca-
demics, and policymakers to ex-
change ideas, make predictions, and
enhance their respective efforts. This
Economic Commentary is a summary
of the May 20 meeting.
ISSN0428-1276On the inflation front, the Roundtable
foresees little tendency for any devia-
tion from the 3 percent trend posted
over the past few years (figure 3). By
the end of 1995, the median forecast
shows the Consumer Price Index (CPI)
rising at a rate of about 3'/» percent,
just marginally above the pace pro-
jected for the latter half of this year.
In evaluating their call on the inflation
outlook, however, the Roundtable par-
ticipants see the risks favoring a
slightly lower-than-expected rate in
1994, but higher-than-expected infla-
tion in 1995 (figure 4). Specifically, the
group sets the probability that this year's
inflation rate will remain under 3 percent
at 63 percent — against only a 37 percent
likelihood of it rising at a faster pace. For
1995, the comparable probabilities are 45
percent that the inflation rate will hold
under 3 percent and 55 percent that it will
exceed that pace.
• "Jupiter's moons are invisible to
the naked eye and therefore can
have no influence on the earth, and
therefore would be useless, and
therefore do not exist."
—Francisco Sizzi,
Professor of astronomy, 1610'
One perspective used by analysts in de-
veloping an economic outlook and
evaluating incoming economic data is
to compare current developments
against historical trends. The episodic
ebb and flow of the overall economy is
usually characterized in terms of busi-
ness cycles, or broadly defined states
of aggregate economic performance.
FIGURE 1 MEDIAN REAL GDP FORECAST
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NOTE: High and low are the average of the three highest and lowest forecasts, respectively.
SOURCES: Fourth District Economists' Roundtable. Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, May 20, 1994; and
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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SOURCE: Fourth District Economists' Roundtable, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, May 20, 1994.
The Roundtable economists see some
difficulty in comparing the current ex-
pansion with other post-WWII epi-
sodes, largely because of recent struc-
tural changes in the economy. These
changes inhibited growth early in the
expansion, but more recently have en-
gendered a stronger cyclical momen-
tum. "In character, we are in the initial
part of expansion and should make
comparisons on that basis," suggested
one observer.
Macroeconometric forecasts exploit
regularities observed in the data. De-
spite the unique aspects of individual
business cycles, the forecasting process
seeks to discern the common factors
across cycles and, assuming that struc-
tural relationships among variables con-
tinue to hold, to project the future.
Stephen McNees of the Federal Re-
serve Bank of Boston has published ex-
tensively on the accuracy and limita-
tions of economic forecasting. Dr.
McNees offered the following thoughts
at the May Roundtable meeting.
• The Accuracy and Usefulness
of Economic Forecasts
Stephen K. McNees,
Federal Resent Bank of Boston
Forecasts can be evaluated along numer-
ous dimensions. The results depend on,
among other factors, the economic vari-
able of interest, the stage of the business
cycle, the forecast horizon, the choice of
actual data, and, most important, the
forecast period under examination. For
example, my research supports the fol-
lowing seven observations.FIGURE 3 MEDIAN CPI FORECAST
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(I) Asset prices are hard to predict reli-
ably. The Efficient Markets hypothesis ex-
plains why this is so by implying that
asset prices follow a random walk. Evi-
dence supports the hypothesis for many
financial market variables (stock prices,
exchange rates, and interest rates), but
the theory does not extend to major
macroeconomic variables (real growth,
inflation, and unemployment rates).
(2) Cyclical turning points, especially
the onset of recessions, are also hard to
predict. This should come as no sur-
prise, since most macroeconomic mod-
eling uses quarterly data and focuses
on the magnitude of change rather
than on the direction of change. Busi-
ness cycle turning points are measured
with monthly, not quarterly, data, and
their essence is timing; magnitude is
clearly a secondary concern. Of the
last four recessions, the only one that
was widely expected was the 1980 epi-
sode. Ironically, because the official
turning point (designated by the Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research)
did not occur until well after several re-
cession calls had been made, forecast-
ers' respectability reached a trough at
about the same time the successful pro-
nouncement was issued.
(3) Forecasts of current-quarter GDP
are much more accurate when measured
against preliminary data than relative to
subsequent revisions. Incoming, high-
fi-equency data produce clear improve-
ments in the accuracy of current-quarter
GDP forecasts as the quarter progresses.
These same high-fi'equency data lead to
only modest improvements in the fore-
casts of revised data.
(4) The large one-year-ahead forecast
errors for real GNP cluster around the
1972-74 and 1981-82 recessions and, to
a lesser extent, the early recovery periods
from the 1980 and 1981-82 recessions.
At other times, these errors have been
fairly small.
(5) After a poor performance in the
1970s, CPI forecasts have become
much more accurate. They now show
no signs of bias and convincingly domi-
nate the predictions of naive models.
(6) From 1953 through the 1980s, the
real GNP forecasts issued by the Uni-
versity of Michigan showed steady im-
provement when compared with either
naive models or the variability of ac-
tual GNP growth. This improvement
has not been sustained in the 1990s.
(7) Based on data from 1962 to 1987,
the Council of Economic Advisers' fore-
casts of real growth and inflation, as
measured by the GNP implicit price defla-
tor, have been more accurate (either abso-
lutely or relative to the forecasts of naive
models) in the second half of the sample
period than in the first. This result does
not hold for nominal GNP forecasts.
Economic forecasts are most helpful
when used along with some informa-
tion on their probable accuracy. Accu-
racy is a multifaceted concept that can
best be defined for a specific applica-
tion. For retrospective comparisons,
identical forecast periods are crucial.Discussion surrounding McNees' pres-
entation highlighted the difficulties
business economists and policymakers
face in actually predicting turning points
in economic activity. Francis Diebold
of the University of Pennsylvania
spoke to the group about his work in
modeling turning points, which he de-
scribes as "regime switches." He em-
phasized that to make progress in iden-
tifying a switch point, business cycle
analysts must look beyond simple fluc-
tuations in real GDP. Professor Diebold
defines business cycles by the comove-
ment of a large and encompassing body
of economic data whose behavior dif-
fers depending on which of the two re-
gimes (expansion or contraction) the
economy is in.
• Measuring Business Cycles:
A Modern Perspective
Francis X. Diebold,
University of Pennsylvania and
National Bureau of Economic Research
It is desirable to have a strong grasp of
the facts before attempting to explain
them — hence the attractiveness of organ-
izing business cycle regularities within a
model-free framework. During the first
half of this century, much research was
devoted to obtaining just such an empiri-
cal characterization of the business cy-
cle. The most prominent example of this
work was Burns and Mitchell's 1946
book, which contained the following em-
pirical definition: "... expansions occur-
ring at about the same time in many eco-
nomic activities, followed by similarly
general recessions, contractions, and re-
vivals which merge into the expansion
phase of the next cycle."
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Burns and Mitchell's definition of the
business cycle has two key features. The
first is the comovement among individual
economic variables. Indeed, the comove-
ment among series, taking into account
possible leads and lags in timing, was the
centerpiece of their methodology. In their
analysis, the authors considered the his-
torical concordance of hundreds of series,
including those measuring commodity
output, income, prices, interest rates,
banking transactions, and transportation
semces. They used the clusters of turning
TABLE 1 MONETARY POLICY PREFERENCES
EXPRESSED BY THE FOURTH DISTRICT
ECONOMISTS' ROUNDTABLE
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SOURCE: Fourth District Economists' Roundtable, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, May 20, 1994.
points in these individual series to deter-
mine the monthly dates of the turning
points in the overall business cycle. Simi-
larly, the early emphasis on the consistent
pattern of comovement among various
variables over the business cycle led di-
rectly to the creation of composite lead-
ing, coincident, and lagging indexes.
The second prominent element of Burns
and Mitchell's definition is their divi-
sion of business cycles into separate
phases or regimes. Their analysis, as
was typical of those at the time, treats
expansions separately from contrac-
tions. For example, certain series are
classified as leading or lagging indica-
tors of the cycle, depending on the gen-
eral state of business conditions.
Both of the features highlighted by Burns
and Mitchell as key attributes of business
cycles were less emphasized in postwar
business cycle models—particularly in
empirical models that focused on the
time-series properties of the cycle. Most
subsequent econometric studies on busi-
ness cycles followed Tinbergen's early
work in using the linear difference equa-
tion as the instrument of analysis. This
empirical literature has generally empha-
sized the time-series properties of just
one or a few macroeconomic aggregates,
ignoring the pervasive comovement
stressed by Burns and Mitchell. Like-
wise, the linear structure imposed
eliminated consideration of any non-
linearity of business cycles that would
require separate analyses of expan-
sions and contractions.
In a recent study, Glenn Rudebusch and
I show how current theoretical and em-
pirical research has revived interest in
each attribute separately? We argue
that nearly a century of literature on the
statistical measurement of business cy-
cles, including many recent articles, may
be interpreted within a more general
conceptual framework that includes
common business cycle factors that
switch regimes. We also provide some
empirical analysis in an effort to unite
the two literatures and to assess the
likely usefulness of factor structure and
regime switching in statistical charac-
terizations of business cycle dynamics.
In the first part of the empirical work,
we deal directly with the composite in-
dex of coincident indicators, which is
essentially an estimate of the common
factor underlying aggregate economic
activity. We ask whether its dynamics
are well approximated by a switching
model. To answer this question, we fit aMarkov switching model to the percent-
age change in the natural logarithm of
the index, allowing for a potentially
switching mean.
Several results emerge. First, the re-
gime switching appears statistically
significant, with the mean in the "bad"
state significantly negative and the
mean in the "good" state significantly
positive. Second, the within-state dy-
namics display substantial persistence.
Third, the estimated "staying" proba-
bilities accord with the well-known fact
that, on average, expansions last
longer than contractions.
In the second part of the empirical
work, we fit switching models to the in-
dividual indicators underlying the co-
incident index and examine the switch
times for commonality. In similar fash-
ion to our analysis of the index, we fit
models to the percentage change in the
natural logarithm of each of the under-
lying coincident indicators, allowing
for potentially switching means. The
component-by-component results are
qualitatively similar to those for the co-
incident index, as would be expected in
the presence of a regime-switching
common factor. Furthermore, there is
commonality in switch times, which
again is indicative of factor structure.
The evidence of switching in the indi-
vidual series, however, is generally
weaker than the evidence of switching
in the index. This is consistent with the
switching-factor argument. Individual
series are swamped by measurement er-
ror, but moving to a multivariate frame-
work allows a more precise extraction
of the factor.
• "When you arrive at a fork in the
road, take it."
—Yogi Berra
One of the aims of the Roundtable is to
provide a forum in which business
economists can critique the conduct of
monetary policy. In that sense, partici-
pants serve as adjunct advisors to the
Federal Reserve. One of the questions
put to the panel concerned the appropri-
ateness of the latest hike in the federal
funds rate from 3.0 percent to 4.25 per-
cent. Specifically, each member was
asked what federal funds rate he or she
would prefer at the present time (table
1). The median view called for main-
taining the current level, with 19 per-
cent of the respondents favoring a
slight 0.25 percentage-point increase
and 38 percent wanting the rate low-
ered by an equal amount.
The second question was what funds
rate the group considers to be consis-
tent with a "neutral" monetary policy,
that is, with maintaining inflation at its
present level. Perhaps not surprisingly,
the median response was that the cur-
rent 4.25 percent rate will hold the
price level in check, with 27 percent of
the group believing that another 0.25
percentage-point increase is necessary
and 33 percent favoring an equivalent
decline. In any event, it was generally
accepted that if the Federal Reserve is
not currently in a position to maintain
the inflation rate, it is close to that goal.
This view seems broadly consistent with
the reported intent of the most recent
hikes in both the federal funds rate and
the discount rate — increases that were,
according to the Federal Open Market
Committee, "designed to maintain fa-
vorable trends in inflation and thereby
sustain the economic expansion."
A question we did not ask the Round-
table participants is what federal funds
rate they perceive to be in line with the
Fed's ultimate objective of price stabil-
ity. Presumably, that would require a
more significant rate increase than has
been seen to date, as only 13 percent of
the group believes that the present 4.25
percent rate is compatible with a disin-
flationary process. If the Federal Re-
serve hopes to achieve price stability,
at what point does our policy shift
from one that attempts to maintain in-
flation to one that actually hopes to re-
duce it? Perhaps that will be a question
for the group's November 3 meeting.
• Footnotes
1. Cited in User's Reference Manual.
SHAZAM Econometrics Computer Program,
New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993, p. 35.
2. See A. F. Bums and W. C. Mitchell, "Meas-
uring Business Cycles," National Bureau of
Economic Research, Studies in Business Cy-
cles, no. 2, 1946.
3. See Francis X. Diebold and Glenn D.
Rudebusch, "Measuring Business Cycles: A
Modem Perspective," National Bureau of
Economic Research Working Paper No.
4643, February 1994.
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U.S. Banking Sector Trends:
Assessing Disparities in
Industry Performance
by Katherine A. Samolyk
While the past decade appears to have
been a difficult time for the U.S. banking
sector, performance within the industry
varied widely. Using state-level data, the
author investigates the extent to which
variations in banking conditions were as-
sociated with differences in bank size and
holding company relationships. Control-
ling for local economic factors, very large
banks had more problems with loan qual-
ity and poor profitability over the period
than did smaller banks; the results, how-
ever, do not indicate an emerging relation-
ship between bank size and bank perform-
ance. At the same time, smaller banks that
affiliate with larger organizations in the
form of holding companies appear to
benefit from the relationships.
Competition for Scarce Inputs:
The Case of Airport Takeoff
and Landing Slots
by Ian Gale
Since 1986, airline carriers have exercised
the right to buy and sell takeoff and land-
ing slots at airports. Questions remain,
however, about the optimal way to allo-
cate these slots. This paper provides a
framework for analyzing competition for
such scarce inputs, describing the outcome
of an auction of slots between two carri-
ers, who may have existing slots, and the
possible outcomes from a merger or take-
over wave. The author finds that the equi-
librium allocation of slots is typically
asymmetric, but not monopolistic, because
as the allocation of slots becomes more
concentrated, the price that the leader
must pay for the marginal slot rises. This
suggests that the concern over monopo-
lization of airports may be misplaced.
Regional Wage Convergence and
Divergence: Adjusting Wages
for Cost-of-Living Differences
by Randall W. Eberts and
Mark E. Schweitzer
After decades of convergence, the eco-
nomic fortunes of U.S. regions appeared to
diverge in the early 1980s as measured by
both per capita income and wages. This
study examines that phenomenon by look-
ing at the effect of relative price-level con-
trols on the convergence/divergence of re-
gional wages. The authors find that once
prices are factored in, relative wage rates
continue to converge across regions due to
rising covariance between price and wage
levels. The results also confirm that the
trend in regional wage variation can be
traced to declining differences in labor mar-
ket valuations of worker attributes rather
than to shifts in the regional composition of
the workforce.
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